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Pursuance, or I Don’t Quite Get de Man

Posted by Jeff Allred (he/him/his) on
Pursuance, or I Don’t Quite Get de Man

Continuing in a line of thinkers pursuing an understanding of how exactly language does, de Man maintains a Structuralist’s careful eye to inner cleavages—reading from “an inch over the text” (1362) and accepting the idea that Text is, to start, some internally working whole. Like his related ideological predecessors Nietzsche and Saussure, Paul de Man shows curiosity about peering under the skin of seemingly autarchical words, interdependent (but destabilized?) atoms that create vivid pieces of literary text. Noting “a highly respectable moral imperative that strives to reconcile the internal, formal, private structures of literary language with their external, referential, and public effects”, he nods to a concern akin to semiologist and linguist Roman Jakobson’s, who took a close eye to the difference between the associative function (the way that in metaphor, one associated word is replaced for another, for de Man called “paradigmatic) and the syntagmatic (the means by which words relate horizontally and temporally, and constitute metonymic meaning).

Admittedly, the challenge seems a sprawling one, and I am often left following de Man’s argument with focused eyes that fail to see through murky waters.

Paul de Man writes on 1368 of how “one of the most striking characteristics of literary semiology […] is the use of grammatical (especially syntactical) structures conjointly with rhetorical structures without apparent awareness of a discrepancy between them.” By rhetoric, he claims to here be speaking of “the study of tropes and figures”—specific way words interrelate to create certain modes of meaning. His issue with writers like Ducrot and Todorov is that they have traditionally treated this rhetoric more as merely a paradigmatic view of words without strong question of they work when contiguous. Heralding one of Jakobson’s concerns at the conclusion of Metaphor and Metonomy, de Man treats a passage of Proust’s Swann’s Way to uncover that there is an abundance of figurative language in which both these modes of language are used in a conjoined fashion, leading to an almost exasperated conclusion: Why has the combination of both been only treated descriptively and nondialectically without considering the possibility of logical tensions?

At this point in his argument, de Man finds a moment to pit stop at the ideas of J. L. Austin regarding the performativity of language: the notion that language is more than descriptive of the world (which has relevance with the map semioticians think about words mapping onto real underlying things), but that enunciating language—utterance, if you will—constitutes an action in itself. Austin postulated the tripartite division of speech acts as locutionary (saying something meaningful), illocutionary (saying something meaningful for some purpose), and perlocutionary (having an effect on those who hear what is said).

In this step of the work, we are juggling a variety of perspectives, this most recent one transcending purely literary concerns and acutely aware of language as taking part in action. Attempting to elucidate his definition of rhetoric, he sets up a semi-helpful dichotomy: grammar, concerning internal relationships between sound, syntax and meaning, is somewhat akin to the illocutionary act; rhetoric, traditionally exclusively a way we describe the perlocutionary way of persuasion, is created only by dint of grammatical function, and so thus “the continuity [between the two] is self-evident”. Admittedly, this is somewhat less so for me, still unsure of what he means by rhetoric, and if I have all the meanings straight: our traditional way of speaking about persuasive oratory, but also another way of describing the poetic ability of language—how indeterminacy of language, which he refers to on the next page with a discussion of Pierce and the infinite deferral of the signified, creates an excess of infinitely refractive meaning. But de Man’s endgame here is to craft the “basis for a new rhetoric that […] would also be a new grammar” (1369).

I’m tempted to give up at this very early point in the text with a formal declaration of defeat. The kind of stability I am looking for in terminology seems nowhere to be found in the work etiquette of the deconstructionist de Man. And more so, the whole point of creating instability seems to run counter to any act of elucidation looking for an easy point A to B to C, in the way I have been proceeding here.

As a kind of white flag, I want to tie back, with his oppositional arrangement of “rhetorization of grammar”, the way in which poetic meaning makes interpretation along grammatical lines impossible. To complement this, de Man touches on the “grammatization of rhetoric”, using his account of Proust to show that figural language can run along the lines of “semi-automatic grammatical patterns”, initially deceiving us into a certain mode of analysis that de Man contests that validity of. In conclusion: the reader is left with nil: there is no safety, no useful guidelines, “the same state of suspended ignorance”. The illusory prize of an indeterminably nebulous language seems like barely any prize at all.

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“Being” Versus “Doing

Posted by Jeff Allred (he/him/his) on

Barbara Johnson’s mode of criticism notably stems from the postmodernist ideas and Melville’s text has elements that can be drawn to the postmodernist era by looking into the relationship between the signifier and the signified, or rather the distinction between “doing” and “being” exemplified by his symbolic characters. By understanding how the text works through allegorical functioning, she is also able to identify the disconnect between the signifier and the signified. This distinction between “being” and “doing” she brings forth by explaining the ways in which Melville describes the characters of Billy Budd, John Claggart, and Edward Fairfax Vere, sound like expectations of what they should be like and how they should be perceived. However the counteracts of these characters display the irreconcilable relationship between the two concepts.

The most prominent example being that of Billy Budd’s character who should represent the Handsome Sailor stereotype, but in being mute is unreliable in communicating his actual identity and so it is unforeseen when he becomes the flawed character. From a psychological perspective, it is possible to “be” one person implicitly and “do” contradictory actions based on what is perceived as acceptable behavior at individual versus social levels, and so I argue further that it is in “human nature” to embody acts of both “good” and “evil” such that there no fully moral or fully unmoral person, leading to what seems to be counteracts of the characters’ personalities. In this same way, different modes of communication can be misinterpreted, especially in literature. There is a consistent uncertainty between the messages being conveyed.

Billy Budd’s lack of intelligence provides an absence of his character, leaving an ambiguity of who his character is by only leaving what is said of him and his expressions. Ironically, though his character cannot understand double meanings of things Billy embodies the very idea that what something looks to be is not necessarily what is. Therefore, his character makes it difficult to read motivation and intention by simply looking at his actions. It is then surprising when he is accused of murder of the “evil” character, Claggart, who had previously warned Captain Vere to avoid falling into the handsome act. Though Johnson exclaims Billy as a transparent character, I argue that he is not easily read simply by the descriptions Melville provides because the narrative is missing. I also argue that Claggart’s speech could have been misinterpreted and disregarded as “good” because his “very pleasantness can be interpreted as opposite” (2262). He is said to uphold a “duplicity, both in his appearance and in his character” and so he personifies the difference between the signifier and the signified. I think that instead, his character is misread and represents a truthful and honest character. The personalities of these characters intertwine, leading me to believe that the nature of man is the same as the nature of literature. It is almost always left up to interpretation. What is at one moment, will not be the next, as there is almost always a duplicity in human nature. Handsome is, is therefore not always what handsome does.

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Is Paul De Man the man?

Posted by Jeff Allred (he/him/his) on

The reading that is up for discussion and interpretation is called Semiology and Rhetoric. First and foremost let’s first look up the definitions of semiology and rhetoric. Semiology is defined as the study of signs and symbols. So what is Paul De Man’s purpose of the discussion on semiology? And why is semiology so important for his argument of language and grammar? Before we get to that we first need to also define rhetoric. Rhetoric is defined as the ability to use language effectively. So the purpose of Paul De Man’s writing is to study the signs and symbols  of language and how to use it. First Paul De Man uncovers the past famous works on language and grammar and criticize their theories because even though they explained language in an accurate manner some inaccuracies were at play. The main problem was that they explained a system for language where as there is more to the theories crafted by the past theoretical works of the 19th century.  Paul De man instead believes that there are a connection to both rheteric and semiology which we can not really seperate from one another. He even explains that metaphors are even more tenacious than facts! This is true considering the impact metaphors have over traditional factorial information. He then brings up examples of semiology with different quotes from French literary writers. They all state that rhetoric language bring symbols upon symbols. In fact symbols give birth to new symbols. This is intriguing to me because so far what we learned from the past few readings was how we learn language with images and our understanding of language is related to the human idea of objects. The difference in belief from Naiditch’s and Paul Da Man’s belief is that words have and symbols have their own meaning. We created meaning through semiotic and rhetoric relationships not through human ideas of objects. After he exemplifies his main ideas behind the relationships of rhetoric and semiology he uses a famous poem as an example of his argument. The peom states as follows:

“O chestnut tree, great-rooted blossomer, Are you the leaf, the blossom or the hole? O body swayed to music, O brightening glance, How can we know the dancer form the dance?”

This famous line came from Yeat’s poem “Among School Children” and Paul De Man makes his most important point about his arguement. That words that impact people do so in an extroadinary way in which semiology and rhetoric reasoning makes the reader grab the words and a blissful manner which is strong than factual sentences.

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“Thought You Knew English?”

Posted by Jeff Allred (he/him/his) on

Language, for me, has always been an interesting subject matter.  On a daily basis, I interact and speak with many people, in the only language that I’ve known—or thought I did— English.  New York City, being the epicenter of global finance and trade, attracts people from all over the world that are in search of opportunity and growth.  Accompanying the constant stream of citywide diversity, are the ways of which these diverse peoples communicate amongst each other: and in America, everyone speaks English.  In a crowd of English speakers, one that speaks English should be able to comfortably relay their thoughts in English, Yes?  Not exactly, and the discomforts lie in the different ways in which a single language can be expressed and interpreted.  People, sometimes think, act and express themselves in ways that are often misunderstood by others.  The English language can also be, often, misunderstood because of its ambiguity in being relayed and received.  Users of the language all agree to the fundamental guidelines of English, which structure sentences into paragraphs and paragraphs into pages.  Pages written by Paul De Man, in the form of an essay, describe certain confusions caused by grammar and rhetoric using late 1970’s sitcom characters as examples.

Edith and Archie Bunker, share a long marriage that is not strictly derived from intense verbal interactions with one another; but one with the values (and issues) of the average, working class household.  Edith understands her husband’s locution after many years of marriage, but fails to understand his rhetoric when he asks the question ‘“What’s the Difference?”’(1370) Pertaining to Archie’s bowling shoes being laced over or laced under, Edith receives his message in grammatical context, only; rendering her completely absent from the substance of his statement.  Archie relayed a message that was simultaneously literal and figurative, or rhetorical.  In transmitting such a message (and for effectiveness) the receiver must be able to understand both the literal and the figurative nature of the message relayed.  Archie also asks his question in a metonymical sense, which infers that both options offered by Edith are the same in value toward the subject of bowling.  Had he chose a preference amongst the options, Archie would be agreeing to Edith’s grammatical approach; instead he choses rhetoric—or an implied meaning— as a response.

“…Grammar allows us to ask the question, but the sentence by means of which we ask it may deny the very possibility of asking.”(1370,71)  By addressing a question, the context is unknown to the addressee—unless they are familiar with the subject matter.  The addressee is as foreign to the subject, as two people attempting to conduct a conversation in two totally different languages.  More times than often, this collapse occurs with people that are speaking the same language.  A (hypothetical) British gentleman and American gentleman are sitting in a bar, sometime in the present, engaged in deep political debate; when suddenly the British gentleman asks the American, “Are you taking the piss?”  The American—if unfamiliar with British rhetoric— will be confused with the question and respond with a polite grammatical retort, “No. But the bathroom is in that direction.”  This response indicates the unfamiliarity of the Brit’s syntactic mode, causing confusion with the American.  The British gentleman was definitely not inferring that the American was impolitely urinating during their discussion; but that he was being mocked by the American for his, drunken, political views.  They both are using the English language to communicate; however, the syntactic bridge, which once allowed the conversation to effectively prevail, has now been severed (causing confusion).  If the American is familiar with British figurative speech, the bridge may still be intact: potentially offering both gentlemen another round of pleasant debate, along with another round of beer.

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