It’s my hot body, and I’ll do what I want!
I’m not quite sure if this is too late in the section, or completely aside the questions we examine. But questions of identity and its epistemic origin, for me, relate directly to our society’s fundamental liberal concept: property. Since I’ve read Locke (and probably since I was a kid), I’ve conceived of property as an object on which labor–as some form of energy directed at an object and meant to manipulate or alter it–is performed. Of course, I’ve never found this understanding satisfactory. For instance, intellectual property has remained incomprehensible to me with this definition. How could one claim ownership of an abstraction?
Liberal philosophy, if I am not mistaken, is premised on the sanctity of individual liberties and a conception of labor that allows for the equal opportunity to elaborate on one’s property. As I’ve mentioned, we attain property through the physical and mental exertions that our labor imparts on an object. In this sense, our body is our most basic property from which we exert the necessary energy to acquire more property. Such a conception is premised on a body that is, in a sense, impermeable to all but our minds–we retain total control of it biologically. Foucault would argue against this point but he would not challenge the prima facie assumption of a body-mind duality that is coexisting yet theoretically separated. Our section on psychoanalysis, however, has illuminated an all too significant aspect of ownership: identification. We choose to own most of our things in a social act that allows other people to read our clothing, for instance, as a signifier of our social standing (among many imbricated identities). The conscious decisions we make in presenting an image of ourselves to the world through an ensemble of stuff is the most patent and ubiquitous performance which Butler identifies. I want to forget her thematic focus on gender for a moment, and focus instead on the deep chasm she spells by breaking the Cartesian binary of mind-body.
How does a body that is permeable and shaped by the social discourse affect notions of property? I think a conception of identity, according to the Lacanians, is an apposite model for this little exercise. Identity formation is a reciprocal process in which the Self construes the Other as an object allowing for a sense of subjectivity, while the concomitant subject construes a Self in the Other so as to gain a sense of objectivity. Property is, in this sense, the identification of the Self in the object to which we have directed our labor. We own our bodies through the act of identifying and claiming a unifying principle with them. I could conceive, along these lines, of an intellectual property, yet I still find the concept moronic.



