The Aesthetics of Truth: Metaphor and Contradiction in Nietzsche’s “On Truth and Lying in a Non-Moral Sense”
How can we ever claim to know any absolute truth about things-in-themselves? Our most raw perceptions of the world are nonetheless filtered through our imperfect senses. We do not see things directly, as they truly are. Our sight is mediated through a light spectrum as it reflects off the object, is received by our retinas, and then travels through the optic nerve into the brain, creating an image. Where is “truth” in this exchange? For Nietzsche, there is none. All our cognition is inherently deceptive, as it necessarily abstracts from the thing-it-itself that it attempts to represent. Hence, “all truths are illusions which we have forgotten that they are illusions, metaphors which have become worn by frequent use” (768).
Reality is messy and inconsistent. No two things are alike. Yet, as humans, we fasten a complex network of conceptions to this ever-changing milieu in an attempt to categorize and understand the world around us. In order to do so, we must ignore the infinitely diverse iterations of a thing, and instead focus only on similarity. “Every concept comes into being by making equivalent that which is non-equivalent” (767). It follows that all perceptions and conceptions are incomplete, and cannot possibly encompass all aspects of the things to which they refer. “[T]he correct perception—which would mean the full and adequate expression of an object in the subject—is something contradictory and impossible; for between two absolutely different spheres, such as subject and object are, there is no causality, no correctness, no expression, but at most an aesthetic way of relating” (770).
So what is one to do with such information? Nietzsche lays out two different types of people, “the man of reason and the man of intuition” (773). The former is one who trusts the truths that are produced by the edifice of human cognition and gains a level of stability from them. The latter forgoes such baseless truths, and liberates himself from the inherent limitations of the edifice upon which all truth is constructed, risking the instability that entails. “[T]he one fearful of intuition, the other filled with scorn for abstraction, the latter as unreasonable as the former in unartistic” (773). It would seem that Nietzsche does not approve of either method. Perhaps there is another way?
I believe this other way can be found within Nietzsche’s writing itself, which embraces the metaphorical, contradictory nature of “truth”. Rather than using analytical arguments to support his claims, Nietzsche employs anecdotes and metaphors. In so doing, Nietzsche acknowledges the metaphorical nature of language, and does not resist it, but rather acts in accordance with it. Similarly, Nietzsche uses seemingly contradictory statements throughout his argument, as can be seen when you observe his statement that “[t]he arrogance inherent in cognition and feeling casts a blinding fog over the eyes and senses of human beings” (765), and compare it to the assertion that “one can certainly admire humanity as a mighty architectural genius who succeeds in erecting the infinitely complicated cathedral of concepts on moving foundations” (769). In the former, Nietzsche is deriding cognition for its falsity, whereas in the latter he praises its genius! How can these two viewpoints be reconciled? Well, if our logic is but another arbitrary human creation, then we need not limit our idea of “truth” to its laws. Perhaps, the illogical contradiction presented by these two statements is closer to the truth of the matter than either logical statement taken in isolation.
This brings to mind two pieces of literature that address the topic of mathematics in very different ways. The first, 1984 by George Orwell, considers the logical certainty of mathematics to be a liberating force. The stories main character, Winston, clings to pure, mathematical truth as a kind of freedom from whatever illogical insanities his dystopian society may be peddling. However wild the storm of “doublespeak” became, Winston could take solace in those few precious truths that he knew to be inviolable. “Freedom is the freedom to say that two plus two make four. If that is granted, all else follows.” Yet, the same type of mathematical truth is taken in a different light when one reads Notes from Underground by Fyodor Dostoevsky. The main character of this story finds mathematical certainty to be an obstacle to the freedom of his thought. “Two times two is four—why, in my opinion, it’s sheer impudence, sirs. Two times two is four has a cocky look; it stands across your path, arms akimbo, and spits. I agree that two times two is four is an excellent thing; but if we’re going to start praising everything, then two times two is five is sometimes also a most charming little thing.” So, which is it? Is mathematical truth our liberator, or our jailer? Perhaps it can be both.

