In “The Work of Art in the Age of Its Technological Reproducibility,” Walter Benjamin considers the ways in which technological reproduction affects the significance of art. The authenticity of a work of art is established by “its unique existence in a particular place” (1053). Benjamin argues that this authenticity is degrades when art is subjected to technological reproduction. The reason for this is twofold: technological reproduction is more independent from the original (therefore, it can effectively change the manner in which the original is received), and technological reproduction can introduce the original into contexts that it otherwise would have been excluded from (hence, the exclusivity of the original is diminished).

The authenticity of an object creates what Benjamin calls the “aura” of that object. In one aspect, aura can be defined as “the unique apparition of a distance, however near it may be” (1055). The authenticity and aura of an object hold within them the object’s history. When one encounters a unique work of art, one unaffected by technological reproduction, such a work would be imbued with an aura, which held within it the work’s historical significance. A unique work of art is created by an irreplicable process, and disseminated by limited means. Hence, the object is inseparable from the historical tradition which brought it about.

By technologically reproducing a work of art, this aura becomes diminished. Such a transition in the reception of art belies “a perception whose ‘sense for the sameness in the world’ has so increased that, by means of reproduction, it extracts sameness even from what is unique” (1056). Hence, the uniqueness and exclusivity inherent in a non-technological work of art is foregone in favor of a reproducibility that tailors art to the masses. Where art was previously tied up in its ritualistic creation, technological reproduction severs this tie, freeing the work of art from its “subservience to ritual” (1057) and allowing its range of exhibition to reach the masses.

In reading this essay, I was unsure whether or not Benjamin approved of this change in circumstance. It appears at times that he laments the “destruction of the aura” (1055), and at other times celebrates the “emancipation” (1057) of art. Rather than take a moral stance upon whether or not technological reproduction is a beneficial change in our society, he merely outlines the consequences of this change, leaving its ethical value ambiguous. This allows the reader to appreciate such consequences for themselves, and decide what value to place therein.

In this spirit, Benjamin’s essay brought to my mind two examples of the effects of technological reproducibility outside of the realm of art. Specifically, I am inspired by the moment in which Benjamin attempts to generalize his thesis: “It might be stated as a general formula that the technology of reproduction detaches the reproduced object from the sphere of tradition. By replicating the work many times over, it substitutes a mass existence for a unique existence. And in permitting the reproduction to reach the recipient in his or her own situation, it actualizes that which is reproduced” (1054). My examples attempt to display the ways in which the effects of technological reproduction can be both beneficial and detrimental.

First, this brings to mind the effect of technological reproduction on the Protestant Reformation. The Reformation would not have been possible if not for the creation of the printing press. Mass reproduction of the Bible allowed for individuals to own copies themselves, whereas the handwritten copies of the past were hard to come by. By mass-producing the Bible, it became “actualized” for those who previously only had access to scripture through the rituals of the Catholic church. Hence, individuals were free to reinterpret the Bible, and to disregard the rituals to which religious practice had been tied for centuries. Here, in my opinion, is a great beneficial effect of technological reproduction, for its ability to equalize.

However, technological reproduction can be very dangerous as well, as can be seen in environmentalist Wendell Berry’s criticism of modern conservationism. Berry criticizes conservationist organizations for presenting their mission as one to protect the nation’s “scenic resources.” By the reproduction of nature imagery, we become detached from the traditions of land stewardship and ecological immersion that once defined our relationship to the land around us. These reproductions of nature imagery “actualize” the idea of a healthy ecosystem for us, even if we live in an urban landscape of cement and steel. “The appreciator of a place perceived as scenic is merely its observer, by implication both different and distant or detached from it.  The connoisseur of the scenic has thus placed strict limitations both upon the sort of place he is interested in and upon his relation to it” (The Unsettling of America, 26). By reproducing scenic imagery of nature, we become disconnected to the rituals by which this nature survives. Needless to say, I consider this a detriment of technological reproduction.

I believe that it is pointless to ask whether technological reproduction is good or bad in itself. Rather, what is more valuable is to consider its affects, as Benjamin does, so that we may be able to direct it in ways that are best suited to its use. Where there are rituals that are harmful, let us throw against them the full weight of our technological-reproductive abilities! Where there are rituals worth preserving, let us keep technological reproduction far away, lest they be swallowed up by it.

In Antonio Gramsci’s The Formation of the Intellectuals it is supposed that all individuals are intellectuals, everyone uses their mind in a theoretical way. He states, ‘All men are intellectuals, one could therefore say: but not all men have in society the function of intellectuals’ (1004). Meaning, any person can bake a cake or use self-checkout at the grocery store, but that does not mean they are a baker or cashier. An intellectual is determined by what they put into every day life that is unrelated to their professional activity.

Gramsci goes deeper with this thought by identifying two strata of intellectuals, the organic and traditional. Organic intellectuals according to Gramsci ‘rise out of membership in social groups that have an antagonistic relationship to established institutions and official power’ (1000). An organic intellectual is a cultural figure or activist. They give a voice to the population who are being repressed such as the working class. Organizers and visionary inventors such as Eminem and Kendrick Lamar are organic intellectuals. They use their voice and wealth to raise a voice for the people who need it the most. They use their platform to speak to the people beyond their population to attract attention to the numerous social issues seen throughout America.

On the contrary, traditional intellectuals according to Gramsci, ‘are the administrators and apologists for existing social and cultural institutions, such as schools, various religious denominations, corporations, the military, the press, political bureaucracies, and the judicial system’ (1000). Traditional intellectuals are believed to belong to a different, elite group. They acquire their information from institutions that are well known, and have been around for a while, ‘long-lived’. Professions such as teachers, preachers, doctors and lawyers represent a continuity with the past, meaning that they have been around for decades, using roughly the same techniques and education from years ago to help them complete their job today. Organic intellectuals get their information from social, political, and cultural experiences going on in the ‘now’, while traditional intellectuals get their knowledge from books and former traditional intellectuals who have been around for a while.

In order for hegemony to exist in a society, there has to be equilibrium between traditional and organic intellectuals. And in order for it to succeed, it has to generate its own organic intellectuals, grown out of the dominant hegemony. Meaning, a single dominant group has to find the organic intellectuals within them to help them balance out the overpowering, traditional intellectuals. The society with the most power is the one that will succeed because of their ‘elite’ title.

In The Work of Art in the Age of Its Technological Reproducibility, Benjamin shows that through the process of technologically reproducing works of art, we lose the time and touch that goes into creating something by hand, and therefore, lose some appreciation as well.  The aura of the work is gone.  According to Benjamin, the aura of something is its unique authenticity.  Traditionally, art has attained value through its physical existence and the feeling someone derives from being in the presence of an authentic work.  When we begin reproducing art for the masses, it devalues “the here and now of the artwork” (1054) and jeopardizes its authority.   

I once visited the apartment of a friend and noticed a series of simple framed sketches hung on his wall with the signature “Picasso” in the bottom corner.  Seeing that signature brought me true excitement.  My friend had the means to potentially afford original art and the thought of Picasso himself drawing those figures brought me genuine excitement.  I asked him about the sketches and he replied, “Oh,  I got them at Ikea.”  Instantly my reverence of the work evaporated as it’s aura dissolved with my knowledge.  This supports Benjamin’s idea that art has a sacredness surrounding its production.   Technological reproduction overrides tradition surrounding the development of artwork and frees it from sacred rituality.  Creativity is no longer an essential component of creation.  Benjamin warns that this new method of producing art “can therefore contribute to the political struggle in ways that it would be a mistake to underestimate,” (1054), and that it can be exploited to the benefit of fascism.  

“As soon as the criterion of authenticity ceases to be applied to artistic production, the whole social function of art is revolutionized.  Instead of being founded on ritual, it is based on a different practice: politics.” (1057).  Benjamin uses Marxist language in talking about the proletarianization of modern man in the wake of the industrial revolution.  Fascism seeks to mock-support the working class in their defiance of capitalism while working to maintain it all the while.  So where does that leave us?  “The logical outcome of fascism is an aestheticizing of political life.” (1070).  In the same way that a beautiful film hides its apparatus, fascism violates the working class by masking it’s true motives.  Trump is a prime example.  He unites his supporters against a myriad of enemies:  Muslim “terrorists”, Mexican “rapists”, “fake” news; anything to distract from the fact that instead of trying to “Make America Great Again,” Trump’s intention is to keep us exactly where we are.

The current mediums and continuous evolution of modern reproducible art is conducive to mass distraction.   Someone who views a work of high art becomes enamoured within it.  Conversely, the “distracted masses” consume new art and make it a part of their being.  Film is able to “mobilize the masses” and turn the viewer into a distracted analyst.  As a modern society, we have become so distracted that we separate ourselves from the rest of America to the point of taking aesthetic pleasure our own self-destruction.  Why does Trump deny climate change?  Why is he so blasé about nuclear weapons?  Why does he think Neo-Nazis are “very fine people?”  Because it is in his best interest as a capitalist to keep the proletarians at war.