Judgment is a Dependent Variable
Johnson’s example of Vere shows us that judges are not above politics but instead intertwined; their commitments are constituents of law regulation. The author writes, “While both Billy and Claggart are said to owe their character to “Nature,” Vere sees his actions and being as meaningful only within the context of contractual allegiance…[law] operating through him” (Johnson 2271). Although Vere differentiates Billy or Claggart’s doings or Billy’s intention for that matter, he must still position his verdict as a deduction from precompiled adversaries.
But it isn’t that simple; Melville’s characters are contrasted “within” themselves, but “between” one another in conflicting ways; inverted parallelism or chiasmus pushes the reader to remold association between things or ideas while maintaining balance. It is one of the central components to which critics dispute the judgment of Vere’s judging and what makes finale commentary challenging for the reader.
However, Johnson states that When a contrast “within” vague conditions is converted into a contrast “between” them, the result is a conclusive determination (Johnson 2274). Still, Melville demonstrates the dilemma of representation in politics, which stems from our position as constructed in association with dependence, even for a judge, like Vere. Johnson makes the following case ” the maintenance of political authority requires that the law function as a set of rules for the regular, predictable misreading of the “difference within” as a “difference between” (Johnson 2275).
But if “repression of ambiguity” is present it thus becomes contradictory, making law established on a “difference within.” And because the mere decision of Vere’s speech is a dependent act that results in slaughter, that judgment is thus open for critique, as readers have done. It is a propelling motion with no ethical conscience, just dependent variables bound by perception and regulation. A continuous ambiguous space.

