Francoise Meltzer’s text investigates the term Unconscious and how scholars theoretically recognize it with a comparative examination of Psychoanalysis’s Sigmund Freud and Jacques Lacan.
She first encourages the questioning of the phrase, reasoning that in its sound use, it is an adjective. It is partly attribution because it is neither a place nor a thing. And it is polysemantic, “Similarly complex is the fact that to be “unconscious” can mean all sorts of things – anything from being asleep to being in ignorance of something, to being in a coma, to having a certain kind of innocence, and so on”(Meltzer 1).
In addition, she is fascinated by the realism bound up in its mysticism, “In other words, the irony is that the unconscious can only be described in, or understood in, the realm and rules of “consciousness”‘ (Meltzer 3). It’s a paradoxical element, both not falsifiable and not secured. Nonetheless, it has assisted in the formation of psychoanalysis.
Meltzer breaks down Freud’s theory into descriptive, dynamic, and systematic categories. Descriptive is best described as Freud’s topographical model, with consciousness showing up on the surface and the unconsciousness hidden beneath. The space or barrier between these two domains keeps the subject disconnected from repressed desire; Meltzer demonstrates how unconsciousness in this sense evolves from an adjective to a noun, an existing place.
Dynamic, as she explains, is then the energy flow of that “place,” the build-up where energy not perceived by the subject generates a coming forth; for Freud, this means via dreams, puns, literature, etc. These pent-up notions appear in obscurity and illogically, reinforcing Freud’s theory of repressed desire.
Systematic then depicts Freud’s later revisions, the Id, the Ego, and the Superego, where sources of each element are gathered to make them understandable as one subject; although employed by Americans as “ego psychology”, the model furthers analytical development due to its contradictions.
Meltzer explains Lacan’s point of view in rejecting Freud’s revision, ” The French, however, led primarily by the analyst Jacques Lacan will see the revision as a repression in itself”(6). For Lacan, Freud’s topographical model is accurate; he asserts that there is a partition between the conscious and unconscious. As Meltzer clarifies, the ego for him is an object rather than a subject. As such, the ego is separate from desire, and instead, it is the derivative of desire. Meltzer notes that “the subject experiences desire as a lack, which they will strain to eradicate “(11).
In this way, the subject constantly advances movement between self and the fulfillment of one’s desires but disables the ability to actualize completion. Freud’s theory proposes that completion is an underlying preexistent reality just hiding in plain sight, which enables the subject to become themselves through decoding such desires.